Political Bureaucratic Cycles: How Politicians’ Responses to Electoral Incentives and Anti-Corruption Policies Disrupt the Bureaucracy and Service Delivery around Elections

Toral, Guillermo

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462001

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3627

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462001

Citación

Toral, Guillermo and Toral, Guillermo, Political Bureaucratic Cycles: How Politicians’ Responses to Electoral Incentives and Anti-Corruption Policies Disrupt the Bureaucracy and Service Delivery around Elections (August 24, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3462001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3462001

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