Constraining Ministerial Power: The Impact of Veto Players on Labor Market Reforms in Industrial Democracies, 1973-2000

Becher, Michael

doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009341716

Constraining Ministerial Power: The Impact of Veto Players on Labor Market Reforms in Industrial Democracies, 1973-2000

Becher, Michael

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3482

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009341716

Citación

Becher, M. (2010). Constraining ministerial power: The impact of veto players on labor market reforms in industrial democracies, 1973-2000. Comparative political studies, 43(1), 33-60. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009341716

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